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1. Introduction
This paper aims to test the main implication of the theoretical model presented
in Marchesi and Thomas (1999), namely that agreement to follow a programme
could be a signal of an indebted country’s willingness and ability to successfully
reform (and use any new money provided for investment rather than consumption
purposes), which is thus rewarded with a debt relief.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, many developing countries have struggled
to repay large amounts of their external debts to both commercial banks and in-
dustrial countries’ governments. In the early ’80s Paris Club creditors provided
reschedulings for low-income countries on non-concessional terms and on market-
related interest rates.2 In the late eighties (1989-’94) the Brady deals addressed
commercial bank lending to government debtors (generally middle-income coun-
tries) and involved a combination of an IMF agreement and debt and debt-service
reduction and rescheduling from commercial banks.
In the same period, Paris Club creditors agreed to provide low-income coun-
tries with concessional reschedulings, conditional on the adoption of IMF adjust-
ment programme, under the Toronto (1988), Trinidad (1990), London (1991) and
Naples terms (1994).3 Since the onset of the debt crisis while the debt situation
of middle-income debtor countries has improved signi…cantly (Boote and Thugge,
1997), heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCS), most of which are in sub-Saharan
2Paris Club creditors are o¢cial (bilateral) creditors of government debt, while London Club
creditors are commercial creditors of private international debt.
3They recognised that most of low-income countries required an actual reduction of their level
of debt, more than repeated reschedulings on “standard terms”. A “concessional” rescheduling
implies a reduction of the net present value of the rescheduled amount.
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Africa, have continued to experience di¢culties meeting their external debt service
obligations. In order to deal with these countries’ speci…c problems, the World
Bank and the IMF have, in September 1996, jointly proposed and implemented
the so called HIPC Debt Initiative.
Very recently, the Fund has been also involved in the East Asian …nancial
crisis and it still seems the case that debt acceptance of a Fund agreement signals
something about the country’s intentions which somehow reassures the market
and in turn makes commercial creditors more willing to accord rescheduling of a
country’s debt.
The rescheduling process is a mechanism which allows debtors not to de-
fault on their loans and to remain in the international …nancial system. It also
prevents creditors from facing the whole consequences of a …nancial crisis. More
speci…cally, it can be considered as a form of “debt reorganisation”, in which pay-
ments of a principal and/or interest falling due in a speci…ed interval, are deferred
for repayment on a new schedule, following negotiations between creditors and
debtors. Since a rescheduling is a postponement of a payment, creditors would
like to have some “guarantee” that this postponement will in fact contribute to
an improvement in the economic conditions of the debtor country and that it will
enable it to better service its external debt. One way to obtain this would be that
the debtor country decides to adopt an adjustment programme supported by the
IMF (Ebenroth, Maina Peter and Kemner, 1995).
In concrete terms, an IMF programme consists of limitation of money sup-
ply growth, decrease in the government budget de…cit, credit control, improved
exchange rate policy and improvement of the trade balance. More recently, it has
also insisted that its borrowers reformed their …nancial system.
In this article we want to test the existence of a signi…cant e¤ect of the adop-
tion of an IMF programme on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling
by creditors, using a bivariate probit model to control for the endogeneity of the
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choice “IMF adoption”. If countries who adopt IMF programmes are more likely
than others to obtain a restructuring of their external debt, we could conclude that
the adoption of a Fund programme could work as a sort of signal of a country’s
“good behaviour” which is then followed by the debt rescheduling. Our results
con…rm the existence of this e¤ect.
We will consider the following IMF programmes, that is Stand by arrange-
ments, Extended Fund Facility (EFF), Structural Adjustment Facilities (SAF)
and Enhanced Structural Fund Facility (ESAF). These programmes were chosen
since they are the most common among IMF programmes. They are set both for
the short and the medium-term and are designed for both middle-income (Stand
by and EFF) and low-income countries (SAF and ESAF programmes). Our de…-
nition of a debt rescheduling is also quite broad as it includes restructuring in the
context of the Paris Club, commercial banks reschedulings, debt equity swaps,
buybacks and bond exchange.
In Section 2 we provide some background to the empirical studies on the de-
terminants of both Fund arrangements and external debt repayment performance.
We then, in Section 3, brie‡y describe the main features of the theoretical model,
while Section 4 develops the empirical one. Section 5 presents the main results
and, …nally, Section 6 concludes.
2. Empirical studies on the determinants of Fund
arrangements and on external debt repayment
performance
2.1. Fund arrangements
The existing empirical literature about IMF programmes has mainly focused, so
far, on the macroeconomic impact of such programmes (see, for example, the brief
survey in Killick, 1995). However, a recent stream of research has also tried to
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specify and estimate a model including the factors which lead developing countries
to borrow from the IMF in the …rst place. There is a demand for participation by
the developing country and there is as well a process of evaluation by the IMF to
determine if a lending programme is accepted. The resulting negotiation gives the
equilibrium outcome. Actually, the Fund’s main target is to enable its members
to overcome their balance of payment problems and, in order to gain access to
any Fund resources at all, a member has to be able to demonstrate a balance of
payment need.
Table 1 below reports a summary of the studies which tried to model the
adoption of a Fund programme by developing countries. Some of them estimated
the size of loans under Fund arrangement (for eg., Bird and Orme, 1981; Bird,
1995), while some others estimated countries’ adoption of a Fund programme
using binary-choice models (for eg., Joyce, 1992; Knight and Santaella, 1997).
One early study (Bird and Orme, 1981) uses OLS regression to …nd a sta-
tistical relationship between drawings on the Fund and key country economic
characteristics, including the balance of payments, the debt service ratio, the rate
of in‡ation, per capita GNP, the level of reserves, the value of imports and the
access to private capital markets (in particular the Eurocurrency market).
6
Table 1: Economic determinants of IMF loans
Study Dep. variable Est. method Sign. regressors
Bird and Orme Drawings on the IMF OLS Current account
(1981) Rate of in‡ation
GNP per capita
Imports
Int. reserves
Euro-curr. credit
Cornelius Demand for IMF credits OLS Debt service
(1987) GNP per capita
Imports
Int. reserves
Cap. mks. borr.
Joyce Fund prog. adoption Logit Gov. expend.
(1992) Int. reserves
Year dummies
Conway IMF participation Probit Prev. adoption
(1984) Tobit Current account
Terms of trade
For. real rates
Year dummies
Bird Drawings on the IMF OLS Rate of in‡ation
(1995) GNP per capita
Imports
Private …nance
Knight and Santaella Arrangement approval Probit Int. reserves
(1997) Bivariate probit Ext. debt service
GDP per capita
Investment
Real exchange rate
Prev. adoption
Year dummy
Gov. revenue
Gov. expend.
Nom. depr. > 5%
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This model provides a good explanation of drawings by developing countries
on the IMF in 1976, but it “breaks down” in the following year. However, on the
basis of 1976 regression, developing countries seem to draw more from the Fund
as their balance of payments deteriorates, their rates of in‡ation increase and
their level of income decreases. It also seems that the IMF and the Eurocurrency
market are complementary rather than competing sources of …nance. The authors’
conclusion is that not only economical factors, but also socio-political (and also
information more at the level of single countries), would be necessary to provide
a better explanation of IMF loans.4
Cornelius (1987) studies the demand for IMF credits focusing only on Sub-
Saharan countries (mainly because they made a large use of Fund credit as they
were constrained in the access to international capital market). His results are
similar to those obtained by Bird and Orme: they provide a good explanation
for the initial period (1975-’77) but not for the second one (1981-’83). In partic-
ular, like in the previous work, the conclusion is that other factors, like social,
institutional and political ones, should be taken into account. However, the most
signi…cant regressors which explain the occurrence of an IMF loan were the cur-
rent account de…cits, the level of in‡ation and the per capita income (with two
positive and a negative coe¢cients, respectively).
Among the papers which adopted binary choice models, Joyce (1992) uses a
logit analysis to identify what factors characterise developing countries’ adoption
of an IMF programme, in the early eighties. He adds domestic credit growth
and the government’s share of domestic output to the regressors already common
in previous studies to discover that countries which entered Fund programmes
had higher rates of domestic credit expansion and more expansionary policies
than “non-programme countries”. Conway (1994) estimates the determinants of
4A rerun of a similar econometric model for the period 1980-’85 produces rather similar
results: the coe¢cients of the in‡ation, income and balance of payments variables are all statis-
tically signi…cant and with the expected signs.
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participation in a Fund arrangement, using both a censored-variable and a probit
approach. He considers 74 countries in the period 1976-1986 and shows that the
most important variables to explain participation in IMF programmes are past
participation in a Fund arrangement, real GDP growth and external factors.
Finally, Knight and Santaella (1997), in a binary choice framework, reckon
that the event of a Fund approval of a …nancial arrangement is the result of
two joint events: both a country’s need to obtain an IMF arrangement and the
Fund approval of the request, on the basis of an evaluation process of the economic
reforms a country intends to adopt. Therefore, they criticise other previous papers
for having considered, either explicitly or implicitly, only the so called “demand-
side” determinants of Fund arrangements. On the other hand, their aim is to
account for both the economic variables that induce a country to ask for an
IMF loan (“demand-side”) and for the economic policy commitments the Fund
examines when decides to approve it or not (“supply-side”). Moreover, they try
also to incorporate, in their empirical model, a better speci…cation of the “timing
of the events”. They argue that economic policy measures, which could provide a
country with the Fund approval, are often taken before the arrangement is actually
accepted by the IMF. Then, the assumption that the initial date of the programme
is at the same time also the initial date of the policy measures’ adoption would
be misleading.
More speci…cally, they obtain both bivariate and univariate probit estimates
of the approval of an IMF arrangement, for a given country in a given year,
using a pooled sample of annual observations for 91 developing countries over
1973-1991. In the bivariate model the two dependent variables are a country’s
demand for an IMF loan and a country’s meeting of the Fund criteria to supply
the loan, respectively. In the probit equation, instead, the dependent variable is
the IMF joint outcome of the two events. In the “demand side”, their estimates
suggest that lower level of international reserves, lower per capita GDP (and
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lower values of its rate of growth), higher values of the external debt service,
lower rates of domestic investment, movements in the real exchange rate and the
dummy indicating previous Fund arrangements, are signi…cative determinants of a
country’s interest in a Fund arrangement. Among the “supply factors”, they …nd
that policy measures to increase …scal revenue, to reduce government expenditure,
to tighten domestic credit and to adjust the exchange rate, positively a¤ect the
Fund approval of an arrangement.
2.2. Debt rescheduling
There are many papers dealing with the probability of the occurrence of a debt
rescheduling by an indebted country. Typically, in this literature, the occurrence
of a debt rescheduling is interpreted (and modelled) either simply as a re‡ection
of a country’s debt repayment di¢culties or as equivalent to a country’s default.
Table 2 below contains a summary of the studies that tried to explain the
occurrence of a debt rescheduling. The common idea in these works is that a
limited number of …nancial, macroeconomic, or socio-political indicators can be
identi…ed as the main determinants of debt repayment behaviour. Saini and Bates
(1984) provide a survey of the development of the quantitative approaches to
“country risk analysis”, where the existence of a probability of debt rescheduling
is one of the possible “manifestation” of such lending risk. They presented the
emergence of probit and logit models as the most used estimation techniques.
The choice of which variables are best to use to predict debt rescheduling
has been discussed in this literature at lenght, so that di¤erent approaches have
been developed to predict the probability of LDC’s debt rescheduling. These are:
a “balance sheet approach”, a “macro approach” and a “structural approach”.
According to the “balance sheet approach” …nancial variables are considered
more relevant to explain the probability of a debt rescheduling. Lloyd-Ellis et
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al. (1989) include three sets of variables in a logit model used to predict the
probabilty of a debt rescheduling. These are the traditional “ratio variables” (as
the debt service to export ratio, the foreign exchange reserves to import ratio,
the rate of growth of per capita GDP and the rate of growth of imports) and
the so called “balance sheet variables” (as the ratio between short, or medium,
or long-term debt over total borrowing from the banks, the proportion of each
country’s debt relative to total bank lending, total bank borrowing relative to
bank deposit, the ratio between the unallocated or undisbursed credit over total
banks’ lending). Finally, there are “other variables”, like the number and value
of reschedulings, which should re‡ect a global attitude to rescheduling.5
They discover that balance sheets variables are more signi…cant than ratio
variables and these results are also con…rmed in a their subsequent paper (Lloyd-
Ellis et al., 1990), in which they estimate two equations: a probit equation predict-
ing the probability of a country’s rescheduling in a given time period and a linear
equation for the quantity of debt rescheduled (using the same set of countries
in the same period).6 Lanoie and Lemarbre (1996) used the same speci…cation
with a cross-section set of data covering 93 countries, in the years 1989 and 1990.
They also discover that the balance sheet variables outperform the two other sets
of variables.
5The idea is that while in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s it was appropriate to think
of developing countries servicing their debts at all costs, before seeking a rescheduling, more
recently, sometimes it might be considered optimal to default or reschedule.
6These two equations were estimated separately by using Heckman’s two-step estimator in
equation 2.
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Table 2: Probability models of debt rescheduling
Study Dep. variable Est. method Sign. regressors
Berg and Sachs Debt rescheduling Probit Income distribution
(1988) Share of agriculture in GNP
Lloyd-Ellis et al. Debt rescheduling Logit Rate of growth of exports
(1989) Bank borr./bank deposits
S-t bank debt/tot. bank debt
L-t borr./total borrowing
For. exchange res./IMF quota
Country’s debt/tot. bank lend.
Unall. credit/country’s lend.
Undis. credit/bank lending
Number of reschedulings
Lee Debt rescheduling Logit Foreign debt/GNP
(1991) Growth rate of p.c. GDP
Interest rate on intern. lend.
Ind. countries’ GNP growth
Variability in p.c. GDP
Domestic debt/GDP
Bäcker Debt rescheduling Logit Undis. country’s cred/bk. lend.
(1992) Country’s debt/tot bank lend.
Bank borr./bank deposits
Growth rate of exports
Wtd. av. spreads of resch.
Resch. and regional dummies
Stock exchange index
Wtd. av. G7 gov. bond yield
Lanoie and Lemarbre Debt rescheduling Probit Unall. credit/total borr.
(1996) Amount of debt OLS For. exchange res./IMF quota
rescheduled (Heckman’s two-step Undis. credit/total bank borr.
estimator) Wtd. av. grace period of resch.
L-t borrowing/total borr.
M/l-t borrowing/total borr.
Imports/reserves
GDP per capita
Debt service/exports
Total debt/exports
Debt amortisation/debt
Investments/GDP
Current account/GDP
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Bäcker (1992) shows how as the prediction lag is lengthened, the signi…cance
of macro-variables (as the ratio between debt service payments and exports, the
ratio between imports and reserves, the in‡ation rate, GDP, interest rates) im-
proves relative to that of the balance sheet data. This fact might suggest that
macro-variables are proxies for more fundamental, longer-term determinants of a
country’s solvency, while …nancial variables provide information about the coun-
try’s current liquidity. More speci…cally, he uses a logit model to estimate the debt
rescheduling probability for 68 debtor countries, using semi-annual data from 1981
to 1988. He integrates balance sheet variables with macro-variables …nding that
the former provided a rather static description of a country’s …nancial situation,
while the latter are more appropriate to describe the medium-long term economic
development of a country and its capacity to ful…ll its debt obligations, which has
a dynamic aspect.
In the “structural approach”, deeper structural characteristics of a country
are related to the probability of a debt rescheduling. Berg and Sachs (1988)
develop a cross-section probit model of debt rescheduling, for 35 developing coun-
tries, which links the occurrence of this event to key structural characteristics of
developing countries (like the trade regime, the degree of income inequality, the
share of agriculture in GDP and the level of per capita GDP). They argue that
outward orientation of trade policy should enhance the growth prospects of de-
veloping countries, as well as their capacity to adjust to external shocks, while a
high degree of income inequality would increase the political pressure for exces-
sive foreign borrowing.7 On the other hand, governments which …nd their political
support mostly in the agricultural sector would be politically more stable and, by
extension, less subject to external debt crisis. Finally higher income countries
may be less likely to reschedule their debt than poorer countries, since the cost
of a rescheduling would tend to be higher for more advanced economies. In their
7The pressure for income redistribution is likely to be greater in economies characterised by
higher income inequalities, in which a government could satisfy the internal demand for higher
public expenditure through foreign borrowing, without either rising taxes or in‡ation.
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model, higher income inequality and the share of agriculture in GDP are found
to be signi…cant variables.
Instead, Lee (1991) tests a model whose explanatory variables were obtained
from a “willingness to pay” model. That is, in his scenario, at each payment, the
borrower compares the expected value of his discounted utility of consumption
with repayment, against the expected value of his discounted utility of consump-
tion with either default or rescheduling.8 In his model the probability of default
depends on six variables, that is the interest rate on international lending, the
growth rate of per capita GDP, the ratio of total foreign debt to GNP, the growth
rate of industrialised countries, the variability of changes in per capita GDP and
the ratio of government debt held domestically to GDP.
Moreover, he considers separately “o¢cial rescheduling” (that is reschedul-
ing payments, on both public and private debt, guaranteed by creditor coun-
tries’ government or o¢cial agencies) from“commercial bank rescheduling” (that
is rescheduling bank loans which are not guaranteed). According to his results,
while o¢cial rescheduling decisions depend on three factors: the economic per-
formance of borrowers, the level of indebtedness and the level of interest rates,
for commercial rescheduling cases (besides the aforementioned factors) the access
to international credit markets becomes also signi…cant. Finally, the author also
mentioned the circumstance that creditors could insist that borrowers obtain a
loan agreement with the IMF as a prerequisite for according a restructuring of
their external debt.
3. The Theoretical model
The main idea of the theoretical paper (Marchesi and Thomas, 1999) is that
the adoption of an IMF programme can function as a screening mechanism that
8Solvency is not considered a relevant issue since the borrower has the resources to honour
its debt obligation.
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allows creditors to distinguish between those countries which intend to use the
“debt relief” as an incentive to invest and later repay and those which do not (or
cannot) do it.
It is assumed that there are two types of country (one with a high return
on the investment, and the other with a low return or willingness to invest) and
asymmetry of information on the country’s type. In the presence of a debt over-
hang, the high productivity country may choose not to undertake the investment,
despite it being socially e¢cient to do so. In this case the creditor would like to
o¤er the country some debt relief, but the low productivity type will also bene…t
from the debt relief. When the country is credit constrained (which seems a plau-
sible hypothesis dealing with indebted countries), this problem can be avoided if
the country decides to undertake an IMF programme in return for debt reduction
(and possibly new money in the form of an IMF loan): only the high productivity
type would be prepared to bear the adjustment costs and thus a separation of the
types is achieved.
More speci…cally, the creditor (the bank) wants to solve two distinct problems
at the same time: the …rst one is the “moral hazard” problem, which directly
derives from the “debt overhang”, that is the lack of incentives to invest for the
“good type” in the absence of any debt relief. The second problem is the need for
the bank to separate between the two types in order not to grant the relief to the
“bad” one (that is the one which will never invest).
Notice that, in the theoretical model, our de…nition of debt relief involved
more a debt reduction rather than a debt rescheduling. We believe that a debt
rescheduling can be considered as a component of a debt relief initiative (in par-
ticular when it is made at concessional terms, as it is the case for low-income
countries). However, di¤erently to the aforementioned empirical papers, where it
was seen generally as an indicator of a country’s debt servicing di¢culties, here
debt rescheduling is considered mainly as a debt relief which creditors may either
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decide to grant or not.
In order to …nd the “qualitative factors” which can in‡uence the probability
of a debt rescheduling, for simplicity, we will focus here only on the …rst problem,
that is on the “moral hazard” aspect.9 Thus, the main idea is to …nd the factors
which a¤ect the amount of debt relief creditors need to grant in order to make
the good type invest and repay. The “moral hazard” condition, which makes the
good type country willing to invest (and repay), is that the bene…ts from the
investment are greater than its costs. After some rearrangements that becomes:
R ¸ D ¡ V (m¡ 1)=(1 ¡ qH) ¡ ®(Q(2) + bS): (3.1)
In equation (3.1) R represents the amount of the debt relief; D stands for
the total amount of external debt and it is positively correlated with R. V (m¡
1)=(1 ¡ qH) corresponds to the outcome of the investment, (m¡ 1)V; divided by
the low income probability for the good type (1 ¡ qH); where (m¡ 1) is equal to
the rate of return on the investment, V represents the investment’s …xed costs in
the …rst period and qH is the probability for the good type to have a high income
in the second period.
Intuitively, as the probability for the good type to have a high income in
the second period increases, it will decrease also its need for the debt relief, since
in the event of a high income the good type will always repay its debt. The
whole expression is negative, this suggesting the existence of an inverse correlation
between a country’s investments and the level of the debt relief.
®(Q(2) + bS) represents what creditors could seize in case of default, where
® is the fraction of available resources which can be used to repay the debt,
Q(2) is the country’s low income value in the second period and bS represents
the bene…cial e¤ect of the programmes adoption on period-two outcomes (where
9If we solved the model taking into account both the “participation” and “the self selection”
constraint we would …nd that basically the same factors will a¤ect the probability of a debt
rescheduling. For more details on this, see the quoted paper.
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1 > b ¸ 0): S is the costs of the IMF adjustment programme and it indicates a
direct reduction of welfare rather than a …nancial cost. It should be viewed as a
loss of social welfare due (for example, to adverse social e¤ects such as reduction of
social services and adverse shifts in income distribution). In Section 4.1.4 we will
discuss better how these qualitative variables will become the control variables of
our empirical model.
4. The Empirical model
In the empirical model we want to test the existence of an e¤ect of a Fund pro-
gramme adoption on the subsequent concession of a debt rescheduling. As we saw
in Section 3 two di¤erent empirical literature have developed, which have consid-
ered, independently, IMF arrangements and debt rescheduling. Here, instead, we
want to estimate a bivariate probit model for the joint determination of a Fund
programme adoption and of the debt rescheduling. Our “priori” is that coun-
tries which decide to adopt an IMF programme will be more likely than others to
obtain a debt rescheduling.
We have taken into account particular kinds of IMF programmes, that is
Stand by arrangements, Extended Fund Facility (EFF), Structural Adjustment
Facilities (SAF) and Enhanced Structural Fund Facility (ESAF) loans. As we said,
they were chosen because they are set both for the short and the medium-term,
both for medium and low income countries and they aim at overcoming both
temporary and structural balance of payments maladjustments. The adoption
of one of these Fund programmes is considered only if it has occurred in the
period 1985 - 1994. The choice of this period is due to the consideration that
international debt strategy has shifted towards a policy more oriented to concede
debt restructuring (respect to one more oriented to providing new loans) only in
the late eighties.
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Moreover, since these countries have adhered to an IMF programme more
than once during the sample period, we have taken into account only their latest
arrangement. The variable which denotes whether a country has obtained an IMF
programme is I; where I is equal one if the country has got the IMF lending and
conditionality package and equal zero otherwise.10
As a measure of the debt rescheduling we used the “total debt rescheduled”
series. It includes restructuring in the context of the Paris Club, commercial
banks, debt equity swaps, buybacks and bond exchange. In this paper o¢cial and
private restructuring are considered together (on this point see Lee, 1991). The
variable which represents debt reschedulings is C, where C = 1 if the country
has rescheduled a part of its commercial debt within not more than two years
since the adoption of the programme (and in any case after the IMF programme
has started).11 In this model timing is crucial. In the …rst place, the indebted
country could either receive or does not receive the IMF loan (and accept the IMF
conditionality that goes with it). Then, creditors decides whether or not to grant
the debt rescheduling to the country.
The bivariate probit speci…cation is the following:
I* = Xb+ u I = 1 iff I* > 0; 0 otherwise (4.1)
C* = Zg + Id+ v C = 1 iff C* > 0; 0 otherwise (4.2)
The disturbances are assumed to be bivariate normally disributed.
µ
u
v
¶
» N
µ
0
0 ;
1 ½
½ 1
¶
Equation (4.1) of the bivariate speci…cation describes the IMF adoption. The
10Actually, the data does not allow us to distinguish between the two alternatives: apply and
do not get the loan and do not apply for the loan. So we are able know only the resulting
outcome.
11If a country actually gets a debt concession only before adhering to the IMF programme
(but not after the adhesion), C will be set equal 0. Moreover, if, in the case of no adoption, a
country gets more than one concession, we considered only the most recent.
18
latent variable for the IMF adoption I* is a linear function of the countries’
macroeconomic characteristics (vector X) which a¤ect the probability to adopt
an IMF programme (they will be speci…ed more carefully in Section 4.1.3). Since,
after the adoption of the IMF programme, these macro-variables would be a¤ected
by the implementation of the programme itself (and thus they would become
endogenous), we take their values two year before the programme is adopted, in
order to make sure they are predetermined.
I* occurs both in the observed dichotomous form in equation (4.2) and in
the latent-variable form in equation (4.1). The sign of the coe¢cient of the di-
chotomous variable I , in equation (4.2), will measure the role of the IMF in
debt concessions schemes and our prior expectation is that it will be signi…cantly
greater than zero.
Equation (4.2) describes the “concession” of a debt rescheduling. The latent
variable for the debt rescheduling C* is a linear function of the countries’ macro
variables (vector Z), and their values as well are taken two years before the oc-
currence of the debt rescheduling. Notice that, in order to input a value of the
control variables, when either I or C is zero, we calculated the average year of
both the events adoption and concession and took the control variables’ values
two years before that year.
4.1. The identi…cation problem
This two simultaneous equations model contains both a reduced form, equation
(4.1), and a structural form, equation (4.2). Notice that while there would be
no problem with the estimation of (4.1) as a univariate probit, we would not
model the impact of the adoption on the rescheduling estimating just a single
probit equation for the probability of the debt rescheduling and adding a dummy
(equal one in case of IMF adoption) to the regressors since this dummy would
be endogenous. More formally, it would be correlated with the error term of the
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probit equation. Thus, unobserved factors in‡uencing both IMF adoption and
debt rescheduling would be interpreted as part of the “IMF adoption” e¤ect.
The structural form is identi…ed if at least one variable in X is not included in
Z:12 This identi…cation problem was not an easy question to solve. To identify the
parameters of the model we use both the dummy “previous Fund arrangement”
(BEF) and the rate of change of the “general government consumption” (GGC).
Our assumption here is that, conditional on the programme adoption, these two
variables do not a¤ect the probability of obtaining a debt rescheduling.
This choice is justi…ed on an economic ground. Regarding the dummy BEF,
it is plausible that countries that have had Fund arrangements in the past will
be more likely than others to enter into an arrangements in the future, because
both the authorities of that countries are already familiar with the Fund operating
procedure, and they have already gained a sort of “reputation” with the Fund.
Therefore, we expect to …nd a signi…cative and positive sign for the coe¢cient
of this dummy). Instead, for the way in which we have constructed variable
C, past Fund arrangements (that is arrangements which have been made many
years before the debt rescheduling) should not in‡uence debt rescheduling in the
present. More speci…cally, we assumed that when reschedulings are conditional
on IMF programmes, only recent ones are assumed to in‡uence them.
The growth of government consumption is one of the variables which deter-
mines the so called “supply side” of a Fund arrangement, that is the probability
that the Fund would approve the request of a loan, rather than a¤ecting the prob-
ability that a country would ask for IMF intervention. This distinction between a
“demand” and a “supply side” on IMF arrangements was made …rst in the paper
by Knight and Santaella (1997) (Section 2.1). Unfortunately, we could not use
here the other three variables in their paper as three more “instruments”; that is
“nominal depreciation exceeding 5%”, “two year change in government revenues”
12See Maddala (1983), p.122.
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and “two year change in real domestic credit”. The …rst two due to the unavail-
ability of these data and the last one because, at the start of the analysis, it was
not a signi…cative instrument.
Restraint on central government expenditure is a key element for the Fund
to approve an arrangement (and thus we would expect to …nd a signi…cative and
negative sign for the coe¢cient of this variable) while, as far as we know, there is
not such an explicit requirement to obtain a debt rescheduling (this is con…rmed
also in our literature survey on the determinants of a debt rescheduling in Section
2.2).
4.2. De…nition of the variables
This model is estimated as a cross section using annual observations, the overall
period goes from 1983 to 1997. There are values corresponding to all the four pos-
sible combination of C and I . The data are taken from the International Financial
Statistics (IFS), the World Bank Tables, the World Development Indicators and
the Global Development Finance. All these sources have presented many lacks in
the data in their series, forcing us quite often to choose between the number of
countries in the sample and the number of variables to include in the equations.
In fact, according to the IFS de…nition, the total number of “developing coun-
tries” would be 158: of those 65 had to be excluded due missing data, both in the
control and in the dependent variables. We assume that the resulting countries
selection is not endogenous.
The variables we have decided to use are described in Table 3 below. We
decided to choose among the most signi…cative regressors we found in the literature
on both IMF arrangements and debt rescheduling, that is:
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Table 3: Variables de…nition (a)
Variable De…nition Units Expctd. sign
IMF Approval of an IMF arrangements Binary
DRES Total amount of Debt Rescheduled Binary
BB Baker and Brady countries Binary +
BEF Previous Fund arrangement Binary +
GDPPC GDP at market prices per capita Curr. US$ –
GDI Gross domestic investment % GDP –
EDT Total external debt stock % GDP +
TDS Total debt service % exports +
RES Total reserves minus gold % imports –
INFL Consumer price index % rate of change +
BOP Balance of Payment % GDP –
EXP Exports of goods and services % imports –
IAR Interest arrears on long-term debt % exports +
PAR Principal arrears on long-term debt % reserves +
GGC General government consumption % rate of change –
(a) the Appendix contains all the calculation details.
As for the control variables they are basically traditional “ratio variable”,
quite common regressors among those we have found in other studies on the
determinants of both IMF arrangements and debt rescheduling. These variables
capture both domestic and external factors. They will be more carefully analysed
in the next two subsections.
4.2.1. Determinants of Fund arrangement
The variables that enter in the equation which determines a Fund arrangement
are policy target variables, whose values are taken two years before the adoption
of the IMF programme.13
As the external factors are concerned, countries with a structural unbalance in
their Balance of Payments (BOP) will be likely to need Fund …nancial assistance.
Thus, we expect that BOP enters with a negative sign in the regression (that is
13Notice that, since during that same year each country could adopt an IMF programme at
di¤erent dates, a two years period before the adoption in a given year, has not exactly the same
“length of time” for every country. In fact, for some country it could be less than two years.
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because the Balance of Payments of the countries in our sample is in de…cit in
most of the cases). We have included also the ratio of the exports over the imports
(EXP), expecting that a country which experiments a low value of its exports will
be more likely to ask for a Fund arrangements. This need for …nancial assistance
will also be re‡ected in a high external indebtedness (EDT). Thus, we expect to
…nd a positive correlation between the dependent variable and EDT. We have
also included another variable, corresponding to the arrears in interests payments
(IAR) as a general indicator of a country’s …nancial di¢culty. The sign here is
expected to be positive.
As the domestic factors are concerned, countries experiencing relatively low
levels in per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDPPC) and low investments (GDI)
will also be more likely to seek Fund assistance. Therefore, we expect to …nd a
negative correlation between IMF and both GDPPC and GDI. As we saw in
Section 4.1, the growth of government consumption (GGC) is one of the two
instruments in the reduced form, where the rate of change in the government
consumption is used to capture the behaviour of the variable “…scal policy” two
years before the programme begins. As we already said, we expect to …nd a
negative coe¢cient for this variable.
We then de…ned the dummies. The …rst one is BEF whose coe¢cient should
be signi…cant and greater than zero. The other one is BB, which equals one for
a country which has adopted the Baker (1986-’88) and/or the Brady plan (1989-
’94).14 Baker and Brady plan have generally involved middle-income developing
countries but also some low-income one (within the International Development
Association (IDA) scheme).15 We expect the coe¢cient of this dummy to be
14The Baker plan set targets for bank and o¢cial lending, called for structural reforms in
debtor economies and, in its latter part, experimented market based debt restructuring. The
Brady plan shifted the attention from a co-ordinated lending to the reduction and rescheduling
of the existing debt.
15The IDA is a special facilities, set in 1989, with the aim to provide grants (up to $10 million
per country) to be used for Brady type cash buybacks or conversion of commercial bank debt
by low-income countries that carried out adjustment programmes and had parallel debt relief
from bilateral creditors.
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signi…cantly greater than zero indicating that those countries which have adhered
to these plans were more likely than other countries to adopt an IMF programme
and accept the conditionality that goes with it.
Compared to the papers of the related literature on IMF arrangements, we
generally have opted for a more parsimonious speci…cation. For example, we in-
cluded only a variable for the balance of payments (BOP), instead of considering
both the balance of payments and the current account. We did not put either
a regressor for the terms of trade or for the foreign real exchange rates. We ac-
tually tried to insert the latter but we found many missing data in those series.
Besides, we believe that the external factors are already “captured” by BOP and
EXP, which is the ratio between exports and imports. We did not put a variable
for Eurocurrency credit (i.e., private capital market, in particular the Eurocur-
rency market), which was considered by Bird and Orme (see above) in order to
investigate whether the Fund and the Eurocurrency market were substitutes or
complementary sources of …nance. However, in earlier estimates, we had a quite
similar regressor (i.e., “non fund …nancing ‡ows”) but it was not found to be
signi…cative.
The variable “government revenue” could be one of the possible instruments
to be used to identify the equation of IMF determinants and we have already
explained in Section 4.1 (on the identi…cation problem) the di¢culties we had
in trying to use it. Finally, among our regressors, we have two variables which
have not been examined in the related literature. They are both interest and
principal arrears on long-term debt. We decided to incorporate them because we
thought that developing countries’ debt repayment di¢culties were an important
component beside their other, more traditional, economic characteristics.
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4.2.2. Determinants of debt rescheduling
In Section 3 we have described the factors which a¤ect the probability of a debt
rescheduling, according to our theoretical model, and they are both domestic
and external components. R is represented here by the total amount of the debt
rescheduling (DRES) whileD is now the total amount of external debt (EDT). The
choice to invest is represented by the variable corresponding to the investments
(GDI). Then, we assumed that qH (the probability to have a high income for
the good type) depends somehow on the degree of openness of the economy that
would be captured by the ratio of the exports over the imports (EXP). Q(2)
was the country’s income in period two (in the low income case) and in the
empirical model it corresponds to the per capita GDP (GDPPC). bS represented
the bene…cial e¤ect on period-two outcomes of the adoption of the programme
but we can not take it into account because we do not consider what happens to
the control variables after the programme is adopted.
As in the “Fund equation” above, we have included a variable corresponding
to the arrears in interests payments (IAR), that explicitly stands for a country’s
…nancial di¢culty. For example, for a debtor country to be allowed into the
rescheduling process with the Paris Club, it has to prove that it will default on its
external payment obligations in the absence of any relief. One indicator of this
condition may be the existence of substantial external payments into arrears. The
behaviour of the Balance of Payments (BOP) could be another indicator of the
severity of a country’s problems. Dummy BB is included. Finally, dummy IMF
stands for the role of the IMF in the debt rescheduling process. The expected
sign of the IMF coe¢cient is positive and expected to be signi…cant.
In sum, regarding the external factors, we expect to …nd a positive correlation
between the dependent variable and EDT, while we expect negative coe¢cients
for both variables BOP and EXP. The sign is expected to be positive for the
coe¢cient of IAR and PAR. As the domestic factors are concerned, we expect that
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both per capita GDPPC and GDI have a negative coe¢cients (as a consequence
of the debt overhang e¤ect and also because we are dealing, generally, with poor
countries). We expect to …nd a signi…cant and positive coe¢cient for the dummy
BB, meaning that those countries which have adhered to these plans were more
likely than others to obtain a rescheduling of their debts.
In this equation we have not considered any of the so called “balance sheet”
variables (for the de…nition of these variables see Section 2.2). This is the case
because we are more interested in more fundamental, longer-term determinants of
a country’s solvency and macro-variables are better proxies for this information,
while …nancial variables tell more about a country’s current liquidity.16 The only
two variables which give an indication on a country’s …nancial situation we have
included are the interest and principal arrears on long-term debt. As in Lee we
also tried to put a variable for domestic debt but our series contained too many
missing data.
As dummies variables are concerned, we have no regional dummies (in earlier
regressions we have actually tried to put them, in both equations, but they were
not signi…cative). We have considered, instead, a dummy for Backer and Brady
plans countries (BB), that we did not …nd in the literature on debt rescheduling.
BB could also be interpreted, in a broader sense, as a dummy for middle-income
countries (even if some low-income ones have adhered to these schemes, too).
5. Estimation results
In Table 4 are presented the estimation results for the …nal speci…cation of our
model estimated as a bivariate probit. We have also estimated other speci…cations
of the model (not reported here for reasons of space). Overall the estimates are
16However, we included no variables representing structural factors, like income distribution or
the share of agriculture in GNP (as in Bergh and Sachs, 1988), nor we try to put the growth rate
of industrialised countries’ GNP (as in Lee, 1991) to take into account industrialised countries’
ability to lend.
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good, in the sense that most of the economic factors enter the estimated equations
with the expected sign and many are signi…cant at conventional 5% signi…cance
level.
In the Fund arrangement equation, the expected signs are all con…rmed except
those of EDT and IAR which are both negative instead of positive. All the
coe¢cients are signi…cant at least at 6%, with an exception made for GDPPC
and IAR, whose coe¢cients are signi…cant only at 15% and 17%, respectively.
The two identifying variables GGC and BEF are signi…cant at 3%.
Thus, as expected, it emerges a strong negative relation between the depen-
dent variable and the rate of growth of government consumption (GGC), the level
of investment (GDI), the level of exports (EXP) and a disequilibrium in the BOP.
It is also con…rmed the existence of a strong and positive relation between the
dependent variable and the two dummy variables corresponding to the adoption
of an IMF programme in the past (BEF) and to the participation to the Baker
and Brady plan (BB). Regarding the role of external indebtedness, it emerges that
the variable EDT has a signi…cant and negative coe¢cient. That is, the more a
country is indebted, the smaller the probability that it will obtain an arrangement
with the Fund
In the equation for the debt rescheduling, the expected signs are all con…rmed
with an exception made for EXP, BOP (which are positive instead of negative, but
not signi…cant) and IAR (which is negative instead of positive and not signi…cant
as well). In this equation only three regressors are signi…cant. Dummy BB is sig-
ni…cant at 5%, this meaning that the adherence to one of the two aforementioned
plans played de…nitely a role in obtaining a debt restructuring. EDT is signi…cant
at 4%, this suggesting a close link between the level of a country’s indebtedness
and the probability of a debt rescheduling. The coe¢cient of the dummy IMF
is positive and signi…cant, at less than 1%, as we expected, this con…rming out
intuition about the e¤ect of IMF adoption on debt rescheduling.
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Finally, Rho has a P-value which is almost zero and has got a negative sign,
which means that the unobservables in the two equations are negatively correlated.
Thus, it seems that the event IMF adoption positively a¤ect the debt rescheduling
only when we explain both of them using our control variables, that is variables
that capture only structural/macro factors and not short-term or stochastic fac-
tors (as shocks are).
In the other speci…cations of the model we have included four more variables
among the control variables. The rate of in‡ation (INFL), as another indicator of a
country’s economic performance and the total debt service (TDS), the total value
of reserves minus gold (RES), the principal arrears (PAR), as general indicators of
a country’s …nancial di¢culty. None of them was found to be signi…cant. In both
equations, the rate of in‡ation and the total value of reserves had the correct signs
(positive and negative, respectively). In the Fund arrangement equation, both the
principal arrears and the total debt service had a negative instead of a positive
sign, while in the equation for the debt rescheduling their signs were correct.
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Table 4: Bivariate Probit Model estimates
Exp. Sign Coef. Std. Err. z P>jzj
IMF
BB + 1.330 0.731 1.818 0.069
BEF + 2.391 0.627 3.815 0.000
GDPPC – -0.0002 0.0001 -1.425 0.154
GDI – -3.646 1.924 -1.895 0.058
EDT + -1.075 0.538 -1.998 0.046
GGC – -3.471 1.551 -2.238 0.025
EXP – -3.777 1.554 -2.430 0.015
BOP – -11.540 6.155 -1.875 0.061
IAR + -1.098 0.815 -1.348 0.178
CONS 4.396 1.611 2.728 0.006
DRES
BB + 0.814 0.417 1.952 0.051
GDPPC - -0.00007 0.0001 -0.586 0.558
GDI - -0.951 1.681 -0.566 0.572
EDT + 0.924 0.444 2.079 0.038
EXP – 0.436 0.742 0.587 0.557
BOP – 0.994 3.384 0.294 0.769
IAR + -0.224 0.379 -0.592 0.554
IMF + 1.346 0.487 2.761 0.006
CONS -1.651 0.899 -1.836 0.066
½ -0.912 0.204 -4.457 0.000
Log-Likelihood -63.68
Pseudo-R2 0.40
No. observations 93
29
6. Conclusions
The results of this paper con…rm that the adoption of an IMF programme (and the
conditionality that goes with it) could work as a sort of signal of a country’s good
behaviour that may, therefore, induce other creditors to concede a rescheduling
of the country’s external debt. Our estimates of a bivariate probit model, which
is used to control for endogeneity, assigns a positive and signi…cant value to the
coe¢cient of the dummy “IMF adoption” in the equation which determines the
probability of a debt rescheduling.
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Appendix
Data sources
The basic data set used in this study consists of annual observations of data
for 93 developing countries over the period 1983 - 1996. All the variable were
taken from the International Financial Statistics (IFS), the World Bank Tables,
the World Development Indicators and the Global Development Finance. They
were constructed in the following way:
Endogenous variables
IMF=
8<: 1 if a country had an arrangement approved duringthe period 1985-1993.0 otherwise
9=;
DRES=
8<: 1 if a country had its debt rescheduled within not morethan two years since the IMF adoption.0 otherwise
9=;
Determinants of the demand for an arrangements
GDPPC = Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market prices (cur. US$)Population
GDI = Gross Domestic Investment (cur. US$)GDP at market prices (cur. US$)
EDT = Total external debt stocks (EDT) (cur. US$)GDP at market prices (cur. US$)
TDS = Total debt service (TDS) (cur. US$)Exports of goods & services (cur. US$)
RES = Total reserves minus gold (cur. US$)Imports of goods & services (cur. US$)
GGC =
³³
General Government Consumptiont
General Government Consumptiont¡1
´
-1
´
INFL =
³³
Consumer Price Indext
Consumer Price Indext¡1
´
-1
´
EXP = Exports of goods and services (curr. US$)Imports of goods and services (curr. US$)
IAR = Interest arrears on long-term debt otstanding (LDOD) (cur. US$)Exports of goods & services (cur. US$)
PAR =Principal arrears on long-term debt otstanding (LDOD) (cur. US$)Total reserves minus gold (cur. US$)
BEF =
½
1 if IMFt¡j =1 for any j > 1
0 otherwise
¾
BB =
½
1 if a country adhered either to the Baker or to the Brady plan
0 otherwise
¾
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Table 5: Countries in the basic sample
Algeria Ghana Panama
Argentina Grenada Papua New Guinea
Bangladesh Guatemala Paraguay
Barbados Guyana Peru
Belize Haiti Philippines
Bolivia Honduras Poland
Botswana Hungary Romania
Brazil India Rwanda
Burkina Faso Indonesia Samoa
Burundi Jamaica St. Kitts and Nevis
Cameroon Jordan St. Lucia
Cape Verde Kenya Senegal
Central African Republic Korea Republic Seychelles
Chad Lao People’s Democratic Republic Sierra Leone
Chile Lesotho Solomon Islands
China Madagascar Somalia
Colombia Malawi Sri Lanka
Congo Democratic Republic Malaysia Sudan
Congo Republic Maldives Swaziland
Costa Rica Mali Tanzania
Côte d’Ivoire Malta Thailand
Dominica Mauritania Togo
Dominican Republic Mauritius Trinidad and Tobago
Ecuador Mexico Tunisia
Egypt Arab Republic Morocco Turkey
El Salvador Mozambique Uganda
Equatorial Guinea Nepal Uruguay
Ethiopia Nicaragua Vanuatu
Fiji Niger Venezuela
Gabon Nigeria Zambia
Gambia Pakistan Zimbabwe
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Table 6: Baker (1986-’88) and Brady plan (1989-’94) countries
Baker plan (1986-’88) countries Brady plan (1989-’94) countries
Argentina Argentina
Bolivia Bolivia
Brazil Brazil
Chile Bulgaria
Colombia Costa Rica
Costa Rica Dominican Republic
Côte d’Ivoire Ecuador
Ecuador Guyana
Jamaica Jordan
Mexico Mexico
Morocco Mozambique
Nigeria Niger
Peru Nigeria
Philippines Philippines
Uruguay Poland
Venezuela Uganda
Yuguslavia Uruguay
Venezuela
Source: Cline, 1995
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